3 edition of Private benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision found in the catalog.
Private benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision
|Statement||Craig Doidge ... [et al.].|
|Series||NBER working paper series -- working paper 11162., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11162.|
|Contributions||Doidge, Craig., National Bureau of Economic Research.|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||38 p. ;|
|Number of Pages||38|
MASTER KEYWORDS LIST Research methods Theories Topics The master keyword list is split into 3 main categories: research methods, theories, and International Cross-Listing International Financial Integration Investment Incentives Ownership / Control Structures o Business Groups o Holding Companies o Family Conglomerates. Biography. Lillian F. Mills is the Beverly H. and William P. O’Hara Endowed Chair in Business. She joined University of Texas at Austin in and served as Graduate Advisor for the accounting doctoral program during and as Department Chair from Start studying BA -International Business Final Vocab Oregon State Spring Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. is an economy characterized by government ownership and control of factors of production. is the abuse of public power for private benefits, usually in the form of bribery. Lang, Lins, and Miller () find that cross-listing improves the information environment of foreign firms. Doidge () finds that cross-listing reduces private benefits of control. Lel and Miller () report that cross listing aligns compensation policies with shareholder interests.
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Additional Physical Format: Online version: Private benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, © Downloadable.
This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross‐list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders.
Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to cross‐list in the United States because of constraints on the consumption of. Downloadable. This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list its Private benefits of control in the U.S.
is related to the concentration of the ownership of its cash flow rights and of its control rights. Theory has proposed that when private benefits are high, controlling shareholders are less likely to choose to list their firm's shares in the U.S.
because the higher standards for. Get this from a library. Private benefits of control, ownership, and the cross-listing decision.
[Craig Doidge; National Bureau of Economic Research.;] -- "This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list its shares in the U.S. is related to the concentration of the ownership of its cash flow rights and of its control rights.
Private benefits of control et al. (b) examined the expected relations between private benefits of control, ownership and the cross-listing decision and found that when private benefits are high, controlling. Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision Craig Doidge, G.
Andrew Karolyi, Karl V. Lins, Darius P. Miller, Rene M. Stulz. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in March NBER Program(s):Asset Pricing Program, Corporate Finance Program This paper investigates how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list its shares in the U.S.
is related to the concentration of the. Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, Karl V. Lins, Darius P. Miller, and René M. Stulz NBER Working Paper No. March JEL No. G15, G34, K00, P51 ABSTRACT This paper investigates how a foreign firm’s decision to cross-list its shares in the U.S.
is related to. Private benefits extraction by the initial owner and the dynamic of ownership and control post‐initial public offering Article (PDF Available) in Managerial and Decision Economics 40(6) July.
Doidge C GA Karolyi KV Lins DP Miller and R Stulz Private Benefits of. Doidge c ga karolyi kv lins dp miller and r stulz School University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City; Course Title ACCOUNTING ; Type. Notes. Uploaded By HinH3. Pages 30 Ratings % (1) 1 out of 1 people found this document.
An interesting aspect to study the convergence of corporate governance is cross-listing. Cross-listing is when a company lists its shares on more than one stock exchange. In recent decades, there has been a drastic increase in cross-listing.
Firms from around the world have sought to list their shares in the by: 5. In a related study, Dyck and Zingales () measured private benefits of control (PBC) in 39 countries using blocks of ownership stock sales during the period of They realized that, on average, corporate control relates to 14% of the equity value of the firm, ranging from.
Dzierzanowski, M and P. Tamowicz () Ownership and Control of Polish Corporations. Corporate Ownership and Control 1, Fama, E. () Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm.
Journal of Political Econ Fama, E. and M.C. Jensen (a) Agency Problems and Residual Claims. Journal of Law and Economics Overall, the results suggest that the permanent effect of cross-listing on a firm's valuation is conditional on firm characteristics, investor recognition, and ownership structure.
First, firms with a one-share-one-vote structure appear to cross-list on U.S. exchanges following Cited by: definition of control, dispersed ownership is about as common as family control but if we move to medium sized firms and more lenient (but perfectly sufficient) definition of control of 10% ownership - widely held firms become an exception and family ownership a dominant pattern, especially in countries with poor investor protection.
“Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision,” with Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi, Karl V. Lins, and Darius P. Miller, Journal of Finance,v64, “Has New York Become Less Competitive than London in Global Markets.
Because of the limit set on private benefits, cross-listing in the US improves the ability of firms to generate and exploit growth opportunities through better use of resources.
We conjecture that this cross-listing advantage (better governance and growth opportunities) makes cross-listed firms more attractive and thus more likely targets than Cited by: 3. In an interesting contribution to this literature, Doidge et al. () find that family/management control is associated with a lower likelihood of cross-listing in the US, because such listings would subject firms to constraining securities laws, including strict disclosure standards and a strong litigation environment, all of which reduce the potential extraction of private by: This paper investigates whether or not private benefits of control by managers and large shareholders influence the financing cost of firms.
Evidence shows that lending banks demand a significantly higher loan spread, higher fees, shorter loan maturity, smaller loan size, stricter covenants, and greater collateral on firms with greater private benefits of by: 2.
T he benefits of control over corporate resources play a central role in modern thinking about finance and corporate governance. From a modeling device (Grossman and Hart ()) the idea of private benefits of control has become a centerpiece of the recent literature in corporate finance, both theoretical and fact, the main focus of the literature on investor protection and its Cited by: Most importantly, when private benefits of control are large – and when control is thus valuable enough – leaving control up for grabs would attract attempts by rivals to grab control and thereby capture these private benefits; in such circumstances, to preclude a control grab, the initial.
that cross-listing by foreign firms in the U.S. improves the protection of minority investors and decreases the private benefits of control. Finally, Stulz, Dahlquist, Pinkowitz and Williamson () suggest that the prevalence of closely held firms in foreign countries with weaker investor protection explains part of the home bias of U.S.
Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-Listing Decision ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 77/, Dice Center Working Paper No.
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 16 Mar Rene Stulz (), “Private Benefits of Control, Ownership and the Cross-listing Decision, (). Differential Information, The Variability of U.K. Stock Returns, and Earnings Announcements”,Author: Andreas K. Georgiou. This chapter summarizes stylized facts on corporate ownership and control structures around the world and their impact on managerial decisions and firm performance.
Recent literature suggests that family control and pyramidal business groups are the two distinct organizational characteristics prevalent outside the United States and the United Kingdom. An important explanatory factor is the.
financial reporting and disclosure environment may have greater costs in the form of control benefits given up to cross-list in the U.S, the marginal benefits of cross-listing should also be greater. Verrecchia () suggests that firms determine their optimal disclosure level after considering both the costs and benefits of disclosure.
The Going Public Decision of Business Group Firms Borja Larrain, Giorgo Sertsios, and Francisco Urzúa I. November Abstract IPOs affiliated to business groups are a large fraction of new issues in global markets. We examine the going public decision of group firms vis-à-vis standalone firms through a model with private benefits of control.
If you need immediate assistance, call SSRNHelp ( ) in the United States, or +1 outside of the United States, AM to PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday. The Covid pandemic is one of the toughest challenges the world has ever faced.
What started as a local crisis in China has since spread worldwide—drastically changing life everywhere. Consistent with Dittman and Ulbricht, Pajuste finds that variables measuring the need to raise capital and to make acquisitions are important determinants of the unification decision and that proxies for the value of control and private benefits (e.g.
control minus cash flow rights) reduce the probability of unification. Cross-listing in the U Cited by: PRIVATE CONTROL BENEFITS AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT about endogeneity of a ﬁrm’s ownership structure, which is time invariant in our sample.1 Further, to the extent that ﬁrm growth and accruals are positively associated, our ﬁnding of less earnings management by insider controlled ﬁrms in industries with more growth opportunities provides ad.
Doidge  studies changes in control premiums around U.S. cross-listings and attributes a decline in the average premium to reductions in private benefits of control associated with improved legal protections. 5 In contrast to these studies, our paper focuses on holdings of foreign stocks and changes in the quantity of holdings around a.
family control, family ownership and the wedge, i.e. the difference between the percentage of the family’s voting rights and cash flow rights) is strong or the CEO is the founder (or a member of his/her generation), there is a greater likelihood that the successor to the family CEO is another.
Price Discrimination, Algorithmic Decision-making, and European Non-discrimination Law Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius In a new paper, 'Price Discrimination, Algorithmic Decision-making, and European Non-discrimination Law' (to be found here), I examine the.
His research interests include all aspects of mergers and acquisitions, corporate governance and wider ownership and control issues, corporate restructuring and cross-listing activities, and empirical corporate finance issues such as capital structure decision-making, dividend policy and capital raising : Amrinder Khosa, Kamran Ahmed, Darren Henry.
Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra‐Legal Institutions. IN‐MU HAW with the recent argument that effective tax enforcement is like a public good in that it can reduce insiders' private control benefits. An implication of this finding is that closer attention to extra‐legal institutions has the potential to Cited by: Ownership concentration, "private benefits of control", and debt financing, Unpublished Working Paper, University of London and University College, London, England.
Gibbs, Paul,Determinants of corporate restructuring: The relative importance of corporate governance, takeover threat and free cash flow, Strategic Management Journal, 14, This study investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance and cross-listing.
In a clean setting where a change in CSR performance can be attributed to the cross-listing, we find a statistically significant and economically meaningful increase in CSR performance for the cross-listed firms.
Moreover, such an increase comes mostly in technical CSR, Cited by: 4. Corporate control, Leadership, M&A, IPO, CEO. Corporate Governance, Financial Constraint, and Government Control State ownership is typically associated with low productivity.
As Shleifer points out, poor performance of SOEs is not only due to the lack of ownership incentives but to the tendency of bureaucrats and politicians to Author: Weibin Zhao. One way to measure the value of private benefits of control A. is to measure the difference in value between non-voting shares and voting shares.
is to measure the value of the "block premium" the value difference between the price per share paid for a control block of shares versus the exchange price of regular shares. both a) and b). The impact of corporate governance practices on R&D efforts: a look at shareholders' rights, cross-listing, and control pyramid 9 June | Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol.
20, No. 5 La relación entre la propiedad institucional y de los directivos y el desempeño medioambientalCited by: While more concentrated direct ownership of controlling families results in a higher market value of equity, indirect ownership obtained through cross-holding provides incentives to extract private benefits and results in value loss.
This finding requires the prompt attention of regulatory bodies, outside investors and other interested parties.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers Number September International Cross-listing, Firm Performance and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis Ugur Lel and Darius P.
MillerNOTE: International Finance Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated tostimulate discussion and critical comment.